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Abstract 
Using dynamic heterogeneous panel data models, this paper estimates short- and long-run 
fiscal elasticities with respect to various cyclical factors for more than 90 countries. We find 
the terms of trade are significant in explaining primary fiscal revenues. Moreover, revenue 
elasticities with respect to real GDP on average are larger than one in the short-run and 
bigger in developing countries than in advanced economies both, in the short- and long-run. 
The analysis highlights the importance of considering short- and long-run elasticities with 
respect to other effects than the output gap, particularly terms of trade, when computing 
structural balances. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION  
How large are fiscal revenue elasticities around the world? The fiscal effects of the global 
financial crisis (GFC) have sparked tax experts and policy makers to think more carefully 
about how to measure the fiscal stance and trends in fiscal balances. For that, an important 
factor is to have accurate estimations of fiscal elasticities—including those for the transitory 
and trend revenue components.  
 
However, very few studies so far have attempted to estimate short- and long-run revenue 
elasticities for a broader country sample than the OECD countries. This is particularly the 
case for analyses controlling for other effects beyond the business cycle, such as terms-of-
trade-, commodity price-, and asset price cycles. Such cyclical factors are also relevant for 
fiscal policies in other countries than the advanced economies (AEs) only. 
 
This paper attempts to fill this gap by estimating short- and long-run revenue elasticities for 
an enlarged sample of 96 countries. It examines both possibilities of heterogeneous and 
homogeneous country elasticities with respect to a broad set of cyclical factors: output gap, 
GDP deflator, terms of trade, financial variables, and unemployment rate.1 We then calculate 
structural fiscal balances with the elasticities estimated for selected cases, providing a trend-
cycle decomposition for different economic variables. 
 
The short- and long-run elasticities are estimated via dynamic heterogeneous vector error 
correction (VEC) panel models. Heterogeneous short-run sensitivities are estimated across 
countries. In turn, long-run elasticities are estimated either heterogeneously for each country, 
by using the mean-group (MG) estimator (Pesaran and Smith, 1995); or homogeneously for 
all countries, via the pooled mean-group (PMG) estimator (Pesaran et al., 1999). 
 
Several reasons cause the revenue elasticities to differ in the short- and long-run (see Sobel 
and Holcombe, 1996; and Bruce et al., 2006). In one hand, long run elasticities measure the 
stable relationship between tax bases and an economic variable over an extended horizon. 
For example, the tax base sensitivity to income may tend to grow over time as income 
steadily grows. If such long run elasticity exceeds one, ceteris paribus, this implies that 
above-trend income steadily improves the overall balance through the revenue side of the 
budget. Long-run elasticities may further depend on the economic structure, improvements in 
revenue collection and other trends in an economy. 
 
                                                 
1
 Given the coverage of our country sample, no data on policy parameters or one-off measures are 
systematically available. Thus, we use a statistical procedure to correct for outliers and for discretionary 
changes in tax policy revenues, making the definition of tax elasticities here close to the one of tax buoyancy 
(Belinga et al, 2014). 
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Short-run elasticities, on the other hand, indicate how a tax base fluctuates over the cycle of 
the economic variable in analysis (e.g., business cycle). In this sense, short-run elasticities are 
related to the stabilization function of fiscal policy (Belinga et al., 2014). For instance, if 
short-run revenue elasticities to income are larger than one, the tax system is deemed as a 
good automatic stabilizer. However, if they are smaller than one, the tax revenue does not 
respond in tandem with the cycle and functions less as an automatic stabilizer.2  
 
Therefore, understanding the dynamic (short- and long-run) properties of revenues structures 
is key. This way, tax structures can be adapted to ensure they generate appropriate revenue 
growth in the future sufficiently funding a publicly desired level of expenditures while 
stabilizing the economy in the short-run.  
 
We estimate revenue elasticities for four economic variables: real GDP, GDP deflator, terms 
of trade, and a financial stress index (FSI). A dummy variable for financial crisis episodes is 
also introduced. When real GDP and GDP deflator are controlled for, the terms of trade and 
the FSI capture extra effects of international trade and financial markets on a country’s 
nominal aggregate primary revenue. 
 
Apart from our short- and long-run estimations, another main innovation of our analysis is to 
control for terms of trade (TOT) in a broad range of countries.3 In countries which 
substantially depend from commodities exports and imports, TOT may have a significant 
effect on fiscal revenue. For oil exporter countries, for example, an increase in export prices 
and then in the terms of trade may augment the export-related fiscal revenue. However, if 
countries provide considerable tax incentives for exports, an increase in TOT may shift the 
production towards exporting sectors, having a negative effect on fiscal revenues. So the 
effect of TOT depends usually on three factors: (i) whether its movement mainly comes from 
export price or import price; (ii) the country’s tax structure related to exports and imports; 
and (iii) how large is the world demand elasticity for the country’s exports (see IMF, 2015a).  
 
Figure 1 conveys the relationship between primary fiscal revenue and TOT in selected 
groups of countries. For emerging economies and, particularly, oil exporters, this relationship 
                                                 
2
 Swaying tax receipts with the cycle may be an important macroeconomic stabilization tool particularly in 
countries belonging to monetary unions (e.g., European Monetary Union) given the centralized monetary policy, 
limitation on the size of the budget deficit, no cyclical cross-country transfer system, and limited price and wage 
flexibility (Wolswijk, 2007). See also (Fatás and Mihov, 2001 and 2012). 
3
 Some studies have already estimated the effect of TOT in selected countries. Turner (2006) considers the case 
for exceptional movements in TOT for those countries whose production of commodities is a substantial share 
of output when estimating the SFBs finding a significant positive effect. Rodriguez et al. (2007) study the 
impact of copper and molybdenum prices on Chile’s SFBs. Aydin (2010) studies the case of South Africa, 
applying a disaggregated method for the calculation of fiscal balances with an emphasis on the effects of 
commodity and asset prices, and credit cycle as well. In turn, Adler and Magud (2015), Celasun et al. (2015), 
and Klemm (2015) discuss how important TOT booms are for fiscal performance in Latin America. 
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seems to be significant and positive; an improvement in TOT leads to larger primary 
revenues in those economies. In turn, for the full sample of countries the relationship appears 
to be negative. 
 
 
Figure 1. Primary Fiscal Revenue and Terms of Trade, 1970–2012 
Source: World Economic Outlook database, International Monetary Fund. 
Note: Primary fiscal revenue excluding interest earnings from total revenues and is presented in percent of nominal GDP. 
 
Accordingly, our main result is that for the 96 economies covered the TOT elasticity is 
significant, indicating the importance of using this variable in the calculation of structural 
fiscal balances. For the total sample that elasticity is indeed negative, but for EMEs and oil 
exporters, the elasticity is highly significant and positive as expected. 
 
Another important finding is that the short-run elasticity with respect to real GDP is 
significantly larger than one for our sample. This is particularly the case for low-income 
countries (LICs), as the subsample analysis indicates. This finding confirms for a broader 
sample of countries, including emerging economies (EMEs) and LICs, previous results on 
the importance of fiscal policy in the short-run (Galì, 1994; Fatás and Mihov, 2001; and 
Debrun and Kapoor, 2010). The estimations also evince that the bracket-creep inflation effect 
on the tax base exists only for AEs in the long-run. Moreover, financial stress and financial 
crisis have statistical significance but, on average, marginal influence on long-run revenues 
in our country sample. 
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Regarding the country groupings, our analysis indicates that revenue elasticities with respect 
to real GDP for EMEs and (particularly) LICs are larger than those for AEs both, in the 
short- and long-run. The long-run effect of terms of trade on revenue is negative for AEs, but 
positive for EMEs, potentially indicating the effects of TOT on these latter countries’ tax 
bases and revenues. For oil producing and exporting countries the TOT have a strong 
positive effect on fiscal revenues in the long run. On the contrary, for countries whose taxes 
on international trade and transactions constitute a large proportion of their total fiscal 
revenue, TOT has a significant negative long-run effect on revenue, suggesting a shrinking of 
that tax base. Financial stress, on average, has a positive effect on fiscal revenues for AEs 
either in the short- or long-run, suggesting effects of taxes on financial and capital 
transactions in those economies (Matheson, 2011; Poghosyan et al., 2015). However, for 
EMEs that long-run elasticity is negative, hinting on permanent effects that financial crisis 
may have in those economies. 
 
With the estimated elasticities, as example of our trend-cycle decomposition, we then 
calculate the structural fiscal balances for Brazil, China, Italy and the US. For these countries, 
we illustrate that while the real GDP cycle and GDP deflator cycle explain most part of the 
fluctuation in fiscal balances, adjusting the balances for cyclical fluctuation of their TOT is 
also important. Yet, financial stress conditions and crises seem to play a relatively small role 
in explaining the variability of their balances, even though again their long-run revenue 
elasticities are statistically significant. 
 
Such findings, therefore, call (i) for an update of fiscal elasticities to include additional cycles 
beyond that of the output gap; and (ii) for the use of both short- and long-run elasticities in 
the calculation of structural balances.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II provides a brief review of the 
relevant literature; Section III explains the econometric model of dynamic heterogeneous 
panels, introduces our elasticity-trend methodology to calculate structural fiscal balances, and 
describes the data explored. Section IV presents and discusses the elasticity estimation results 
in detail, including those for the sub-sample analyses and robustness checks. The structural 
fiscal balances calculation for our selected countries is then performed in Section V. At last, 
Section VI concludes the paper. 
 
 
II.   LITERATURE REVIEW 
Bornhorst et al. (2011) define structural fiscal balances as an extension of cyclically adjusted 
fiscal balances, correcting for a broader range of factors than only for the output gap effect 
such as asset prices, commodity prices and TOT, inflation effect, and so on. Normally there 
are three steps to estimate the structural fiscal balances: (i) identify and remove one-off fiscal 
operations such as public expenditure on a natural disaster; (ii) assess the impact of the 
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business cycle (output gap) on fiscal revenue and expenditure; and (iii) estimate the effects of 
other economic cycles or factors. In practice, the second and third steps can be done together, 
using the elasticity-trend approach. 
 
The elasticity-trend approach consists of three additional steps: (i) estimate the fiscal revenue 
and expenditure elasticities with respect to real output and other factors such as asset prices 
and TOT; (ii) perform the trend-cycle decomposition for real output and other factors; and 
(iii) calculate the trend levels of revenue and expenditure, and then the structural fiscal 
balances, using the estimated elasticities and trend levels of real output and other factors. 
Two main methods are used to implement the elasticity-trend approach according to the data 
availability and the aim of research. One is called the aggregated method for which 
elasticities are used to measure the sensitivity of total revenue and spending with respect to 
output gap and other cyclical factors. The other is the disaggregated method for which 
elasticities specific to various revenue and expenditure components (e.g., personal income 
taxes, corporate income taxes etc.) are estimated separately. Before applying these techniques, 
one has to determine what types of cyclical factors including and beyond output gap should 
be considered. 
 
Another important issue is how to estimate the fiscal elasticities with respect to the different 
factors chosen to calculate the SFB. Among the existing literature, fiscal elasticities with 
respect to different factors, such as output gap, asset prices, commodity price and TOT, and 
inflation, are broadly investigated, either using an aggregated method or a disaggregated 
method. Girouard and André (2005) and, more recently Price, Dang, and Guillemette (2014) 
discuss the cyclically adjusted budget balances for OECD countries in detail, adopting a 
disaggregated method in which different tax categories’ elasticities with respect to output gap 
are estimated separately. The relevant elasticity is then the product of two elasticities: the tax 
revenue elasticity relative to its base, and the base’s elasticity relative to output gap. 
 
When adjusting fiscal balances, inflation is an important factor to be considered. Inflation 
alters the distributive properties of nominally defined tax systems, and generates bracket-
creep effects on tax revenues (Immervoll, 2000; Abiad and Ostry, 2005; Clayes, 2007; and 
Escolano, 2010). Zeng (2012) examines the determinants of the primary fiscal balances for a 
panel of countries, and finds that inflation appears to have a positive effect on real fiscal 
balances. Accordingly, Woo (2003) finds that inflation affects fiscal deficit for developing 
countries only. 
 
Although not estimating revenue elasticities, Borio et al. (2013) discusses the relationship 
between financial cycle (represented by credit cycle and house price cycle) and the 
macroeconomics, including structural fiscal balances. These authors claim that neglecting the 
financial cycle can significantly mask underlying problems in fiscal policy given that 
financial booms can flatter the fiscal accounts as illustrated by the recent experiences of 
Spain and Ireland (see Benetrix and Lane, 2011). More recently, Poghosyan et al. (2015) 
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describe an operational approach for incorporating the impact of asset prices in the 
calculation of SFBs. Those authors discuss that not accounting for the fiscal impact of asset 
price cycles can encourage a procyclical stance if temporarily high revenues are passed 
through into expenditures. They further find that asset prices are imperfectly synchronized 
with the business cycle and are quantitatively significant with an average pre-crisis fiscal 
impact ranging from about ½ to 2 percent of GDP. 
 
Closer to our analysis related to asset prices, Price and Dang (2011) explain the necessity of 
incorporating the asset prices effects when removing the transitory components of fiscal 
balances. These authors estimate SFBs correcting for house-price and equity-price cycles for 
OECD countries in a country-by-country basis. The econometric approach used is an auto-
regressive-distributed-lag (ARDL) (1,1,1,…,1) model, which estimates both the short-run 
and long-run fiscal elasticities with respect to output and asset prices. After obtaining those 
short-run and long-run elasticities, they adjust the fiscal revenues for the asset price cycles 
effects measured in terms of deviations from the so-called “fundamental” and smoothed asset 
prices. Those authors also show that asset price movements are independent of and 
uncorrelated with the output cycle. Also looking at asset prices cycles Kanda (2010) 
performs a case study of Ireland, investigating the asset booms’ effect on structural fiscal 
positions. Farrington et al. (2008) further adjust fiscal balances for equity and stock market 
effects. 
 
Finally our approach follows the earlier papers on the estimation of short- vs. long-run 
revenue elasticities. Such literature was initiated by Dye and McGuire (1991) and started 
using time series techniques with Sobel and Holcombe (1996), who also examined more tax 
instruments. More recently, Bruce et al. (2006) analyze short- and long-run responses of state 
personal tax revenues and sales tax bases to changes in state personal income using the same 
techniques. These authors show that the average long-run elasticity for income taxes is more 
than double that for sales taxes in US states. Wolswijk (2007) provides estimates for short- 
and long-run base elasticities for the Netherlands for the period 1970–2005,  finding that 
short-run elasticities often are lower than long-run ones in the Netherlands, particularly when 
taxes are subdued. Consequently, shocks to tax revenues tend to be aggravated by the 
dynamics of short-run elasticities. Thus, ignoring those differences between short- and long-
run elasticities may contribute to negative revenue ‘surprises’ (tax receipts being below the 
long-run value) and an incorrect assessment of the fiscal stance. At last, Belinga et al. (2014) 
estimates short- and long-run tax buoyancy in OECD countries between 1965 and 2012. 
They find that, for aggregate tax revenues, short-run tax buoyancy does not significantly 
differ from one in the majority of countries; yet, it has increased since the late 1980s, 
indicating that tax systems have generally become better automatic stabilizers. Long-run 
buoyancy exceeds one in about half of their sample, implying that GDP growth has helped 
improve structural fiscal deficit ratios. 
 
 10 
 
 
 
 
Overall, two points are important emphasizing about the existing literature. First of all, most 
of the existing papers study SFBs and estimate the relevant short- and long-run elasticities for 
only one country (case study), or a group of (advanced) economies (such as OECD countries). 
A general investigation of across a large sample of countries including emerging and 
developing economies is scarce. Second, few studies estimate the fiscal elasticities with 
respect to all the important cyclical factors, including TOT. This paper tries to close those 
gaps by estimating country-specific short- and long-run revenue and expenditure elasticities 
with respect to a broad set of business cycle and other transitory effects (including TOT), and 
to a large set of countries, as many emerging and developing countries. Both the 
heterogeneity and homogeneity of country-specific elasticities are examined in detail. 
III.   THE ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
A.   The Econometric Model 
To estimate fiscal elasticities, we adopt a panel data version of the econometric model of 
Price and Dang (2011). We use an ARDL model distinguishing between short-run and long-
run elasticities. Our ARDL(p,q,q,…,q) panel data model can be described as follows: 
 
 ', ,
1 0
,
p q
it ij i t j ij i t j i it
j j
y y   
 
    δ X  (1) 
 
where 1,2, , ,?i N  are the countries in our sample; 1,2, , ,t T  are the years in our sample; 
ity  is the logarithmic value of aggregate primary fiscal revenue itPFR  or primary 
expenditure itPFE  for country i  in year t ; 
1 2( , , , ) 'kit it it itx x x X  is a 1k   vector of 
explanatory variables for country i in time t ; i  represents the country-specific fixed effects; 
the coefficient for the lagged depend variable; ij , is a scalar; and the coefficient 
'
ijδ  is a 
1 k  vector. T  must be large enough such that for each country the dynamic model can be 
estimated separately. The dimension for the vector of explanatory variables, itX , depends on 
the data availability and whether the dependent variable, ity , is the fiscal primary revenue or 
fiscal primary expenditure (in logarithm). 
 
When we consider the nominal aggregate primary fiscal revenue, itPFR , we adjust it to 
various cyclical effects generated by the output gap, inflation, TOT and financial conditions 
(this latter indicated by indices of share price, house price or financial stress). Such effects 
can be denoted by the following set of variables it :  
 
{ _ _ _ _, , _ }, , , ,it it it it iit it it tln RGDP ln Def ln TOT ln SP ln UnemP FSI pH        (2) 
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where ,_ itln RGDP  _ ,itln TOT  ,_ itln SP  and _ itln HP  are the logarithms of real GDP, TOT 
index,
4
 share price index, and house price index respectively. _ itln Def  is the logarithm of 
GDP deflator, itFSI  is the financial stress index (Balakrishnan et al., 2009), and itUnemp  is 
the unemployment rate. Then it itX  is a subset of it , and how many variables it 
contains depends on the data availability and data properties. 
 
Aggregate fiscal revenue can be viewed as the product of real fiscal revenue and an 
aggregate price index such as GDP deflator. Real GDP can be roughly regarded as the tax 
base of real fiscal revenue, capturing the real cyclical effect of output on fiscal revenue. GDP 
deflator is another independent variable in the regression, capturing the nominal effect of 
aggregate price and the bracket-creep effects of inflation on tax revenues. 
 
In the literature, the effect of aggregate price is sometimes ignored when nominal aggregate 
fiscal revenue is cyclically adjusted, and only the effect of real output gap is considered. 
However, the aggregate price level of an economy also exhibits cyclicality, which is then 
transmitted to the cyclicality of the inflation rate (see IMF, 2015b). Hence, given that 
inflation is likely to alter the distributive properties of nominally defined tax systems and has 
the bracket-creep effects on tax revenues (Immervoll, 2000; Abiad and Ostry, 2005; and 
Escolano, 2010), we expect that the elasticity of nominal fiscal revenue with respect to GDP 
deflator is greater than one. 
 
Given that we explore the general influence of financial markets as a whole on the aggregate 
fiscal revenue, the financial stress index ( itFSI ) is a comprehensive measure capturing a 
broad part of stress in a country’s financial system. It is calculated by Balakrishnan et al. 
(2009) and updated to the year 2012. In this methodology, financial stress captures the degree 
of how the financial system of a country is under strain and its ability to intermediate is 
impaired. It is associated with four fundamental characteristics of financial markets: (i) large 
shifts in asset prices, (ii) an abrupt increase in risk and uncertainty, (iii) liquidity droughts, 
and (iv) concerns about the health of the banking system. A value of zero for itFSI  implies 
neutral financial market conditions on average across the sub-indices; while positive values 
imply financial strain. A value of 1 indicates a one-standard-error deviation from average 
conditions across sub-indices. Thus, financial crisis is here defined when itFSI  is equal to or 
greater than 3 for any country i and period t.5 
                                                 
4 Terms of trade index is calculated as 100 times the ratio of export price index over import price index, where 
export price index is the deflator of total exports of goods and services, and import price index is the deflator of 
total imports of goods and services. 
5
 
itFSI  is constructed in a slightly different manner for AEs and EMEs. To capture three financial market 
segments (banking, securities markets, and exchange markets), 
itFSI  for EMEs comprises five components 
(Continued…) 
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Thus, with the set of variables it , we can examine two aggregate effects and two 
compositional effects on nominal fiscal revenue. The two aggregate effects are respectively 
the real GDP aggregate effect and the GDP deflator nominal aggregate effect. By controlling 
these two aggregate effects, the two compositional effects from international trade and 
financial markets reveal the additional effects on trade related taxes and financial-markets 
related fiscal revenues.  
 
Hence, we simplify the ARDL(p,q,q,…,q) in (1) to an 𝐴𝑅𝐷𝐿(1,1,1, … ,1) model as follows: 
 
 
' '
, 1 0 1 , 1 ,it i i t i it i i t i ity y       δ X δ X  (3) 
 
where 1 20 0 0 0( , , , ) '
k
i i i i   δ , and 
1 2
1 1 1 1( , , , ) '
k
i i i i   δ . Equation (3) can be further inserted 
into an error correction model (ECM): 
 
 
' '
, 1 , 1 0 ,( ) Δit i i t i i i t i it ity y c       θ X δ X  (4) 
 
where 1i i    is the equilibrium correction parameter, representing the error-correcting 
speed of adjustment between the short-run and long run effects of the fiscal policy;
/i i ic    ; and 
1 2
0 1( ) / ( , , , ) '
k
i i i i i i i       θ δ δ  links the short-run fiscal elasticities     
( 0
j
i  and 1
j
i ) and the long-run elasticities (
j
i ) with respect to the relevant explanatory 
variable, jitx . The coefficient i  is expected to have a significantly negative value, as long as 
it is assumed that there is indeed a long-run equilibrium and the system will return to the 
long-run equilibrium when it deviates. 
 
If 0i  , then there is no evidence for a long-run relationship. When 0i   and the long-run 
elasticities are finite, Equation (4) degenerates to: 
 
 '0Δ .it i i it ity     δ X  (5) 
 
Equation (5) is frequently employed to estimate fiscal elasticities when one does not consider 
the long-run effects of cyclical factors (Bornhorst et al., 2011). 
                                                                                                                                                       
related to “banking-sector beta”, stock market returns, time-varying stock market return volatility, sovereign 
debt spreads, and an exchange market pressure index (EMPI). The overall index is a composite measure of 
these sub-indices and captures markets movements relative to averages or trends, as they are likely to signal 
strain in financial markets. In turn, 
itFSI  for AEs comprises seven components and has more information on 
banking sector and securities markets. For an empirical analysis using this index see Cimadomo et al. (2014). 
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However, we use an ARDL model in this paper for the following reasons. First of all, there 
may be compositional effects on the tax base (especially for the aggregated method), e.g., 
short-term shifts in the consumption towards higher-taxed goods, driving up the short run 
elasticity (Price and Dang, 2011). To capture this kind of compositional effect and its long-
run influence, the ARDL model is a good option. Secondly, there are at least two kinds of lag 
effects of explanatory variables on fiscal revenues that cannot be captured by only estimating 
short-term elasticities. One is the lag effect due to the market incompleteness such as the 
stickiness in wages. For example, if the inflation rate is high in one period, nominal wages 
should increase as well, but due to the stickiness of nominal wages it usually takes one 
additional period to adjust it. This lag effect, therefore, also affects the personal income tax. 
Another lag effect is due to the revenue accounting and collection (Escolano, 2010; Price and 
Dang, 2011), which may indicate persistent effects on revenues of the change in the 
underlying economic variable, e.g., real GDP growth.6 
 
With the short-run and long-run elasticities estimated and the one-off fiscal operations 
adjusted for each country, the trend levels of fiscal revenue can be calculated as follows: 
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j j
i i i
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j j j j
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j
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 
 

      (6) 
 
where the stars denote the trend levels of the relevant variables, and L  is the lag operator for 
time t . Equation (6) is intuitive, as long as we pay attention to the two short-run elasticities 
in Equation (3), 0
j
i  and 1
j
i , and write Equation (6) in its equivalent form below: 
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When the aggregate nominal fiscal primary expenditure, itPFE , is under consideration, we 
only adjust it one-to-one to the cyclical effect of the aggregate price level but not to the real 
output gap or unemployment rate gap. That is because the unemployment-related expenditure 
is only a small part of social security expenditure, which itself is less than 20 percent of total 
expenditure for most countries. This is consistent with a rule of thumb for the aggregated 
method: zero-elasticity assumption for real aggregate fiscal primary expenditure. So its trend 
level is calculated as below: 
 
                                                 
6
 Regarding accounting effects, for example, even though the system of national accounts (SNA) and the OECD 
Revenue Statistics data in principle record taxes on an accrual basis, in some cases the liability to pay can only 
be determined in a later accounting period than when the income accrues. 
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  * *( ) exp( _ ) _ ,it it it itPFE PFE ln Def ln Def  (8) 
 
With these two trend levels estimated, we can calculate the structural primary fiscal balances 
for country i  ( itSPFB ) as follows: 
 
 * *.( ) ( )it it itSPFB PFR PFE   (9) 
 
B.   Empirical Strategy 
We estimate Equation (3) and (4) in a panel data set up. For that at least three alternative 
estimation methods can be used based on the extent to which they assume and account for the 
heterogeneity of fiscal elasticities. One possibility is the mean group (MG) estimation in 
which country-specific equations are estimated separately and the averages of the estimated 
elasticities are investigated. This method assumes heterogeneity for both the short-run and 
long-run fiscal elasticities across countries. In fact the MG model is a Random Coefficients 
Model (RCM) with the coefficients following the random models below: 
 
 1 0 0 2 1 1 3 ,:a i i i i i iH        ,δ δ η δ δ η,  
 
where 1i , 2i , and 3i  are assumed to have zero means and constant covariances, and their 
higher-order moments and cross moments are assumed to exit and be finite; the coefficients 
 , 0 , 1  are the mean values of the relevant heterogeneous coefficients. The above RCM 
can be characterized in an alternative way, using short-run and long-run elasticities, and the 
error correction parameter: 
 
 1 0 0 2 3: , . ,b i i i i i iH        δ δ ξ θ θ ξ  (10) 
 
Pesaran and Smith (1995) show that the MG approach provides consistent estimates for the 
mean of the coefficients when the data’s time series dimension is large enough. The mean 
values of the heterogeneous country-specific fiscal elasticities can be viewed as the average 
sensitivity of fiscal revenue with respect to explanatory variables.7 
 
                                                 
7 For the estimation of long run elasticities (co-integrating vectors), one could also employ group mean FMOLS 
(fully modified OLS) method (Pedroni, 2000), for which each individual FMOLS estimator corrects for 
endogeneity and for serial correlation. If one cares about cross-section dependence problem, CCEMG (common 
correlated effects mean group estimator) (Pesaran, 2006) could also be employed. However, the cross-section 
dependence problem is not likely to exist in our model, since real GDP and GDP deflator are always included as 
explanatory variables and they can capture the influence of potential global common factors. 
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Another option is the traditional dynamic fixed effects (DFE) model in which both 0i , and 
1i  are assumed to be the same for all the countries. In this case both the short-run and long-
run fiscal elasticities exhibit homogeneity across countries. This assumption is not 
completely realistic, especially for the short-run fiscal elasticities. Different countries are on 
the different levels of development and have different economic structures and business cycle 
properties. For example, the fiscal revenue elasticity with respect to TOT for an export 
oriented economy may be different from that of a more closed economy, at least in the short 
run. Econometrically, Pesaran and Smith (1995) show that if heterogeneity does exist in a 
dynamic panel data model, the pooled estimation of traditional DFE model would yield 
inconsistent and misleading parameter estimates. 
 
Besides the above two options, there is an intermediate approach called pooled mean-group 
(PMG) method (Pesaran et al., 1999). The PMG approach assumes that the short-run fiscal 
elasticities  0i , intercepts  ic , error-correction parameters  i , and error variances are 
heterogeneous across countries; whereas the long-run elasticities  i  are restricted to be 
homogeneous over the cross sections. 
 
Similarly to the MG method, the PMG approach also yields consistent estimate for the mean 
of short-run fiscal elasticities by taking the arithmetic average of country-specific short-run 
elasticities.  As explained previously, it is reasonable to assume that different countries 
should have different short-run fiscal elasticities with respect to different types of cyclical 
effects. The adjustment speed, indicated by the error-correction parameter, could be different 
as well. However, if the assumption of long-run homogeneity is not true, the PMG estimator 
would be not consistent, and a downward bias for error-correction parameter would be 
generated (Robertson and Symons, 1992; Pesaran and Smith, 1995). 
 
The PMG method used to estimate the dynamic heterogeneous panel data model is 
represented by Equation (3) with the following assumption on the long-run fiscal elasticities: 
 
 0 : 1,2, , .iH i N  θ θ,  (11) 
 
The PMG model is estimated using a maximum likelihood methodology: either the Newton-
Raphson algorithm; or the “back-substitution” algorithm (Pesaran et al., 1999). The null 
hypothesis of long-run homogeneity is tested via a Hausman statistic. Due to omitted group 
specific factors or measurement errors the country estimates could however be severely 
biased (Pesaran et al., 1999). Hence, it is necessary to do “poolability” tests based on long-
run pooling restrictions. 
 
The Hausman test relies on the result that an estimate of the long-run elasticities in the PMG 
approach could also be derived from the average (mean group) of the country regressions. 
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This means that the average of the MG long-run elasticities estimates are consistent under 
both 0 : iH θ θ  and 3:b i iH  θ θ ξ . But for the PMG approach, the elasticities estimates are 
only consistent under 0H . When the long-run elasticities are homogeneous ( 0H  holds), the 
PMG approach will yield more efficient estimates. This Hausman test statistic can be 
described as: 
 
  
1 2ˆ ˆa ~ˆ' v r ,kHausman q q q 

     
 
where qˆ  is a 1k   vector of the differences between the average long-run elasticities of the 
MG estimation and the PMG long-run elasticities estimates; and  ˆvar q  is the corresponding 
covariance matrix. Under the null hypothesis  0H  that both of the two estimators are 
consistent, but one (PMG) is efficient, then  ˆvar q  can be easily calculated as the difference 
between the covariance matrices of the two estimators. If the pooling assumption of long-run 
elasticities is not correct, the estimates of PMG approach will no longer be consistent and the 
Hausman test statistic will reject the null. On the other hand, if the Hausman test is not 
rejected, the economies in the panel are homogeneous enough from a statistical perspective 
to assume common long-run elasticities. 
 
The homogeneity assumption of long-run fiscal revenue elasticities with respect to some 
factors, such as real GDP and GDP deflator, can be justified by theoretical predictions. In a 
typical DGSE model with economic growth and taxes, such as in Liu (2014), the economy 
nominal fiscal revenue and nominal GDP normally exhibit balanced growth properties at the 
steady state. This indicates that in the long run the growth rate of nominal fiscal revenue is 
equal to the growth rate of real GDP plus the growth rate of GDP deflator. In other words, 
the long-run elasticities of nominal fiscal revenue with respect to real GDP and GDP deflator 
both should be one. 
 
These DSGE models usually do not feature progressive taxation, issues with revenue 
collection, or a bracket-creep effect of inflation, which would suggest that the long-run 
elasticity with respect to GDP deflator could be larger than one. In this case, assuming the 
homogeneity of long-run fiscal revenue elasticities with respect to real GDP and GDP 
deflator for all the economies appears reasonable. Later on, we implement a Kao 
homogenous panel co-integration test to examine the long-run homogeneity assumption 
across countries. In turn, assuming that in the long run the relevant elasticities of different 
economies may vary around a common constant favors the MG approach (or random 
coefficients model). 
 
Before estimating the MG or PMG model, panel unit root tests and panel co-integration tests 
are also performed. First of all, all the series including ity  and ( 1,2, , )
j
itx j k   should be at 
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most  1I  process. We apply the IPS (Im, Pesaran and Shin, 2003) panel unit root test. 
Secondly, there should exist co-integration relationship between the dependent variable ity  
and the vector of explanatory variables, itX . We thus perform the traditional Kao 
homogeneous test (Kao,1999) together with the heterogeneous panel co-integration test 
introduced by Pedroni (1997, 1999), under the null hypothesis of no co-integration. 
 
At last, besides examining country specific elasticities, this paper also investigates mean 
elasticities for certain country groupings. The country-specific elasticities can be used to 
evaluate the country-specific influence of explanatory variables on fiscal revenue and then to 
calculate structural fiscal balances. The mean elasticities help us judging the average effects 
of influencing factors for certain country groups and the comparison among different 
groupings.  
 
C.   Data 
The data used in this paper is an annual unbalanced panel dataset covering the years from 
1970 to 2012 for 147 countries. Table A1 in the Appendix provides the data sources and 
Table A2 describes the raw panel data. Since we use an aggregated method to estimate fiscal 
elasticities,8 fiscal revenue, expenditure, and fiscal balance respectively refer to general 
government primary revenue (GGPR), general government primary expenditure (GGPE),
9
 
and net operating balance, i.e., the difference between GGPR and GGPE.   
 
Given that we are also interested in whether the fiscal elasticities behave differently among 
different country groupings, we divide our sample (147 countries) into three groups. These 
groups are defined according to the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department’s grouping method: 30 
advanced economies (AEs), 29 emerging market economies (EMEs), and 88 low income 
countries (LICs). 
 
Special attention is paid to the commodity exporting countries whose fiscal revenue should 
be largely influenced by the commodity prices and TOT. A country is defined as a 
commodity exporter if the exports of its primary commodities constitute more than 50 
                                                 
8
 The aggregated method is also preferred in our estimations given that more disaggregated variable of tax 
revenues are available for a much more reduced sample of countries, affecting the broadness of our country 
coverage. 
9 Primary fiscal revenue and expenditure are calculated when interest income and interest expenditure are 
excluded from general government revenue and general government expenditure respectively. Due to the data 
unavailability for many countries about the effects of one-off factors on fiscal aggregates, we use stastical 
procedure treating and eliminating outliers as one-off factors. 
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percent of its total exports, like in Cavalcanti et al. (2014).10 Among 50 commodity exporter 
countries, 10 of them are oil producers. For detailed country groupings and the list of 
commodity exporter countries, see Table A4 and A5 in the appendix. 
 
As shown in Table A2, the raw data for 147 countries is unbalanced and the number of 
observations for some countries variables is small. To ensure reliable regression results, we 
delete countries whose observations for fiscal revenue or real GDP are less than or equal to 
14. We also delete countries with data outliers, in which an outlier is defined when (i) the 
GDP deflator inflation is higher than 100 percent; or (ii) the fiscal revenue-GDP ratio is 
bigger than 100 percent; or (iii) the growth rate of TOT index is greater than 100 percent. 
 
The processed panel data, which is used to estimate models, is summarized by Table 1 below. 
The descriptive statistics of the underlying variables are presented in Table A3. Ninety-six 
economies are retained while nearly one third of the total 147 countries are deleted. The 
deleted countries with poor data quality are formed mainly by LICs, whereas the major 
advanced and emerging economies are retained. For nominal fiscal revenue, asset prices and 
financial stress index nearly 80 percent of the observations are retained. 
 
Table 1. Summary of the Processed Panel Data, 1970–2012 
 No. of cross 
sections 
Observations per cross section No. of 
observations minimum average maximum 
𝑙𝑛_𝑃𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 96 15 25.6 43 2457 
𝑙𝑛_𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 96 15 25.6 43 2459 
𝑙𝑛_𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 96 15 25.5 43 2449 
𝑙𝑛_𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 96 14 25.1 43 2405 
𝑙𝑛_𝐻𝑃𝑖𝑡 17 16 35.4 41 601 
𝑙𝑛_𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑡 34 10 22.7 42 772 
𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡  38 6 21.3 33 811 
 
Given the processed panel data, Table 2 shows the pairwise correlation coefficients for the 
levels and first-order differences of all the possible explanatory variables when we estimate 
the fiscal revenue elasticities. For the first-order differences of these variables, their 
correlation coefficients are relatively small. Nevertheless, for the levels, the correlations 
among asset price indices and GDP deflator are large. This is one reason why we only choose 
the itFSI  instead of the house price index and share price index in the coming model 
estimation, when considering financial market conditions. Another reason is that the itFSI  is 
a more general index of financial markets and by using it more countries will be covered by 
                                                 
10
 The literature has various definitions of commodity exporters. In some cases, these are defined as countries in 
which fiscal revenues originated from resource exports correspond to 20 percent or more of their total revenues 
(See IMF 2012 or Araujo et al., 2013). 
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the econometric model as well. A third reason is related to panel co-integration, which will 
be explained in the following section. 
 
Table 2. Pairwise Correlation Coefficients: Level and First-order Difference 
 𝑙𝑛_𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 𝑙𝑛_𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑙𝑛_𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 𝑙𝑛_𝐻𝑃𝑖𝑡 𝑙𝑛_𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑡 𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡  
𝑙𝑛_𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 1.000 (2459) 0.025(2353) 0.029(2309) 0.408(584) 0.452(737) 0.098(773) 
𝑙𝑛_𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 -0.151 (2449) 1.000 (2449) 0.100(2309) 0.493(574) 0.123(727) 0.079(773) 
𝑙𝑛_𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 -0.055 (2405) 0.046(2405) 1.000 (2405) -0.014(564) 0.162(727) -0.018(773) 
𝑙𝑛_𝐻𝑃𝑖𝑡 0.368(601) 0.938(591) 0.124(581) 1.000 (601) 0.182(389) 0.040(461) 
𝑙𝑛_𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑡 0.192(772) 0.769(762) 0.139(762) 0.833(401) 1.000(772) -0.110(456) 
𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡  -0.025(811) -0.136(811) -0.034(811) -0.099(478) -0.181(481) 1.000(811) 
Note: the lower-triangle entries are the correlation coefficients for the levels of relevant variables, while the upper-triangle 
entries are for the first-order differences. The numbers in the parentheses are the corresponding observation numbers of the 
pairwise samples. 
IV.   MODEL ESTIMATION AND RESULTS 
In this section, we display the results of the panel unit root test and co-integration test. 
Secondly, the estimations of the short-run and long-run fiscal elasticities across countries are 
presented. The homogeneity and heterogeneity of long-run fiscal elasticities are examined 
and discussed it detail. Then we describe the country sub-sample analyses, focusing on 
advanced economies, emerging economies, and commodity exporter countries.  
 
A.   Panel Unit Root and Co-integration Tests 
Before estimating Model (4), we make sure that all the variables, including the dependent 
and explanatory, are at most  1I  processes. And there is indeed a co-integration relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables. 
 
Table 3 evinces that the nominal primary fiscal expenditure, real GDP, TOT, house price, 
and share price index (all in logarithm) are  1I  processes for the whole panel. That is 
because the relevant IPS test cannot reject the null hypothesis (panel unit root). The ADF unit 
root tests for individual countries tell a similar story: for most of the cross sections the 
corresponding time series indeed have a unit root. For the logs of the nominal aggregate 
primary fiscal revenue  itPFR , GDP deflator  ,i tDef , itFSI , and unemployment rate , the 
IPS tests reject the panel unit root null hypothesis at the 5 percent significance level, but 
ADF unit root tests for individual countries cannot reject the individual null for most of the 
cross sections. 
 
These variables in first-differences are all stationary (Table 4). The IPS tests reject the null 
hypothesis for all the variables in the panel, and individual ADF unit root tests also reject the 
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null for most cross sections. Therefore, all the variables used in the estimations are at most 
 1I  processes; and their first-order differences are all panel stationary. 
 
Table 3. Panel Unit Root Test: Levels 
 cross  
sections 
No. of series 
with unit root 
No. of series 
without unit root 
IPS-test 
statistic 
IPS-test 
P-value 
𝑙𝑛_𝑃𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡  96 71 25 -3.17 0.00 
𝑙𝑛_𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡  96 81 15 4.33 1.00 
𝑙𝑛_𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡  96 89 7 7.79 1.00 
𝑙𝑛_𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 96 65 31 -5.10 0.00 
𝑙𝑛_𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡  96 87 9 2.21 0.99 
𝑙𝑛_𝐻𝑃𝑖𝑡 17 16 1 -0.20 0.42 
𝑙𝑛_𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑡  34 33 1 0.15 0.56 
𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 38 28 10 -6.50 0.00 
𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 61 49 12 -15.71 0.00 
Note: The critical values of the IPS-test statistic for the significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% are respectively -2.33, -1.64 
and -1.28 (left tail of the standard normal distribution).  For the ADF unit root test for individual countries, when the null 
hypothesis (there is a unit root) is rejected at the 5% significance level, then the relevant time series is regarded as having no 
unit root. 
 
Table 4. Panel Unit Root Test: First-order Differences 
 cross  
sections 
No. of series 
with unit root 
No. of series 
without unit root 
IPS-test 
statistic 
IPS-test 
P-value 
∆𝑙𝑛_𝑃𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡  96 23 73 -23.46 0.00 
∆𝑙𝑛_𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡 96 17 79 -24.83 0.00 
∆𝑙𝑛_𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 96 21 75 -23.64 0.00 
∆𝑙𝑛_𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 96 42 54 -16.19 0.00 
∆𝑙𝑛_𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡  96 3 93 -34.25 0.00 
∆𝑙𝑛_𝐻𝑃𝑖𝑡  17 7 10 -6.30 0.00 
∆𝑙𝑛_𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑡  34 10 24 -12.16 0.00 
∆𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡  38 5 33 -19.30 0.00 
∆𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑖𝑡 61 11 50 -38.89 0.00 
Note: The critical values of the IPS-test statistic for the significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% are respectively -2.33, -1.64 
and -1.28 (left tail of the standard normal distribution).  For the ADF unit root test for individual countries, when the null 
hypothesis (there is a unit root) cannot be rejected at the 10% significance level, then the relevant time series is regarded as 
having a unit root. 
 
Moving to the regression of Equation (4), we estimate several dynamic heterogeneous 
models using different explanatory variables, given the different number of observations of 
each variable. For that, we test whether there is a panel co-integration relationship between 
dependent and explanatory variables for several combinations. Table 5 lists the results of 
Kao’s homogeneous and Pedroni’s heterogeneous panel co-integration tests for five 
combinations.11 The Kao homogenous panel co-integration test is used for the PMG models, 
                                                 
11
 Real GDP and GDP deflator are always included as explanatory variables, indicating that the fiscal revenue 
elasticities with respect to output gap and the aggregate price level are the basic ones we are interested, and they 
can be viewed as two control variables while other cyclical factors’ effects on fiscal revenue are being 
examined. 
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since it assumes homogeneous co-integrating vectors corresponding to homogeneous long-
run fiscal elasticities. The Pedroni heterogeneous co-integration test is used for MG models, 
since it allows heterogeneous co-integrating vectors.   
 
Table 5. Panel Co-integration Tests: P-values 
Tests Statistics (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
Pedroni 
 
Panel 𝜈 0.22 0.89 0.29 0.60 1.00 
Panel rho 0.00 0.06 0.90 0.97 1.00 
Panel PP 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.02 0.00 
Panel ADF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Group rho 0.12 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 
Group PP 0.00 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.00 
Group ADF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Kao ADF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
No. of cross sections 96 96 17 34 36 
Note:  Seven combinations of  dependent variable and explanatory variables are respectively: (1)  𝑙𝑛_𝑃𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡, 𝑙𝑛_𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡, 
𝑙𝑛_𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 ; (2) 𝑙𝑛_𝑃𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛_𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛_𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛_𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 ; (3) 𝑙𝑛_𝑃𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛_𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛_𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛_𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 , 𝑙𝑛_𝐻𝑃𝑖𝑡 ; (4) 
𝑙𝑛_𝑃𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡, 𝑙𝑛_𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡, 𝑙𝑛_𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑙𝑛_𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡, 𝑙𝑛_𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑡; (5) 𝑙𝑛_𝑃𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡, 𝑙𝑛_𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡, 𝑙𝑛_𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡, 𝑙𝑛_𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡, 𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡. For the four within-
dimension cases of Pedroni test, we use the weighted statistics. The null hypothesis is there is no panel co-integration 
relationship. 
 
For all the five cases analyzed the Kao statistics in Table 5 reject the null hypothesis that 
there is no panel co-integration relationship. So under the assumption of co-integration 
homogeneity, it can be regarded that all the six cases have panel co-integration relationships. 
Hence, the PMG approach can be applied to all of them. However, if the co-integration 
homogeneity does not hold strictly, the tests are no longer consistent. Therefore, we rely 
further on the Pedroni heterogeneous panel co-integration test, which is more general (see 
also Caceres et al., 2013). 
 
There are seven statistics of the Pedroni panel co-integration test: four based on within-
dimension approach and three based on between-dimension approach. According to Pedroni 
(1997), among these seven statistics Panel ADF and Group ADF statistics are more reliable. 
Using these tests, we find that there is a co-integration relationship among  ln itPFR , 
 ln itRGDP , and  ln itDef —Model (1) in Table 5. That is because both Panel ADF and 
Group ADF statistics reject the null, besides fiveof the seven Pedroni statistics also rejecting 
the null hypothesis of no co-integration at the 5 percent significance level. 
 
Now we add another variable  ln itTOT , getting Model (2) in Table 5. At the 10 percent 
significance level only two Pedroni statistics of seven fails to reject the null hypothesis of no 
co-integration, and both Panel ADF and Group ADF statistics reject the null. So, we 
conclude that there is a stable long-run relationship among  ln itPFR ,  ln itRGDP , 
 ln itDef , and  ln itTOT . 
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Model (3) in Table 5 adds the variable of house price into our benchmark Model (2), Model 
(4) adds the share prices, and Model (5) adds the itFSI . Due to the data unavailability of 
asset prices for most developing and low income economies, the number of cross sections 
decreases sharply when asset prices are taken under consideration. Comparing Models (3), (4) 
and (5), we can find that Models (4) and (5) perform better than Model (3) under the panel 
co-integration test: four Pedroni statistics (including both Panel ADF and Group ADF) reject 
the null hypothesis. Model (5) covers more countries than Model (4). Combining this 
coverage of Model (5) with the reasons explained in Section III.C, we consider only itFSI  
and estimate Model (5), abstracting from the variables of house price or share price. 
 
To summarize, based on these cointegration tests, we estimate Models (1), (2) and (5) of 
Table 5 to obtain fiscal revenue elasticities with respect to various cyclical factors. Model (1) 
only considers real GDP and GDP deflator and is a basic model. Model (2) is our baseline 
regression, which covers as many countries as possible and simultaneously covers as many 
explanatory variables as possible. Model (5) takes all the explanatory variables of interest 
into account, including financial variables, but covers only 36 countries, most of which 
advanced economies. 
 
B.   Elasticity Estimation Results 
We report both the MG and PMG model estimation results of fiscal revenue elasticities 
across countries for Models (1), (2) and (5) of Table 5. The Hausman test judges which 
approach suits the data better. The corresponding results are shown in Table 6, 7, 8 
respectively. Again, for the MG approach, we estimate the dynamic model for each 
individual country separately, and report the average short-run and long-run elasticities. For 
the PMG approach, the dynamic heterogeneous panel model is estimated by maximum 
likelihood method with the long-run fiscal elasticities homogeneous across countries. 
 
Real GDP and GDP Deflator 
 
Our first analysis investigates the fiscal revenue elasticities with respect to the output gap and 
the deflator gap when real GDP and GDP deflator are included as the only explanatory 
variables. According to Table 6, the Hausman test statistic for such specification (Model (1) 
of Table 5) is 1.32, and the corresponding P value  is 0.52. Therefore, we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis 0H  and, thus, the PMG estimator is the preferred estimator (most efficient). 
The mean values of the short-run elasticities with respect to real GDP and GDP deflator 
across countries are respectively 1.44 and 0.94 for the PMG approach, both of which are 
statistically significantly different from zero at the 1 percent significance level. 
 
The average short-run elasticity with respect to real GDP is also statistically different from 
one. Our average estimation is 1.44, which is different from the unit fiscal revenue elasticity 
with respect to output gap assumed for aggregated method (Fedelino et al., 2009; and 
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Bornhorst, et al., 2011) or for the disaggregated method (Girouard and André, 2005; and 
European Commission, 2005).12 This result highlights the automatic stabilizing role of the 
fiscal revenue in the enlarged sample of 96 countries beyond the OECD countries (Belinga, 
2014). For the possible bracket-creep effect of inflation on nominal fiscal revenue, the 
average short-run elasticity with respect to GDP deflator estimated here, 0.94, is not 
significantly different from one. So on average, we find that the nominal fiscal primary 
revenue moves in tandem to the GDP deflator in the short run across the 96 countries in the 
sample. The long-run fiscal revenue elasticities with respect to the real GDP are on average 
significantly larger than one for the PMG (preferred) estimator. As it will be shown later on, 
this result holds only for LICs, suggesting that the tax base has increased more than 
proportionally to the real GDP. Such result may be related to the increase on revenue 
mobilization through tax reforms promoting progressive taxation and improvements on 
revenue collection in the LICs (Gupta and Tareq, 2008; IMF, 2011). Moreover, the (average) 
error correction parameter (ECP) for the PMG approach is -0.32, which is a significantly 
different from zero. It indicates the adjustment to the long-run trend is gradual, with only 
about one third of that adjustment occurring within one year. 
 
Table 6. Fiscal Revenue Elasticities (Mean): Real GDP and GDP Deflator, Full Sample 
  MG PMG (preferred) Hausman test 
VARIABLES LR SR LR SR P-value 
ECP  -0.587***  -0.323***  
  (0.032)  (0.027)  
𝐷. 𝑙𝑛_𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡   1.438***  1.438***  
  (0.115)  (0.105)  
𝐷. 𝑙𝑛_𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡  0.886***  0.941***  
  (0.077)  (0.061)  
𝐿. 𝑙𝑛_𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 0.908*  1.151***  0.74 
 (0.527)  (0.020)   
𝐿. 𝑙𝑛_𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 0.949***  0.998***  0.87 
 (0.220)  (0.013)   
Constant  -4.470***  -2.242***  
  (0.487)  (0.193)  
Joint Hausman test Statistic=1.32 P-value=0.52 
Observations 2351 
No. of countries 96 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Thus, from Table 6 we conclude that: (i) the short-run fiscal revenue elasticities with respect 
to the output gap are heterogeneous cross countries, and their mean value is 1.44, 
significantly larger than one; and (ii) it makes sense to assume the homogeneity of the long-
                                                 
12
 Specifically these papers estimate fiscal revenue elasticities larger than one for corporate and personal income 
taxes, equal to one for indirect taxes, and smaller than one for social security contributions. 
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run elasticities, which are 1.15 and 1.00 with respect to real GDP and GDP deflator 
respectively. 
 
Baseline Model Including Terms of Trade 
 
Model (2) of Table 5 is our most comprehensive specification, including the real GDP, GDP 
deflator and TOT; and covering all the 96 countries under consideration. Table 7 displays its 
MG and PMG estimation results, whereas the estimated short-run fiscal revenue elasticities 
for advanced and emerging economies are listed in Table A6 in the Appendix. The Hausman 
test cannot reject the null of long-run homogeneity (statistic of 1.08 and P value of 0.78). 
Hence, we choose again the PMG estimator for this specification.  
 
Some results regarding the fiscal revenue elasticities with respect to real GDP and GDP 
deflator are consistent with those of the previous subsection. The (average) short-run 
elasticity with respect to real GDP is significantly larger than one. 
 
Table 7. Fiscal Revenue Elasticities (Mean): Baseline Model, Full Sample 
  MG PMG (preferred) Hausman test 
VARIABLES LR SR LR SR P-value 
ECP 
 
-0.657*** 
 
-0.319***  
  
(0.038) 
 
(0.029)  
𝐷. 𝑙𝑛_𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡  
 
1.541*** 
 
1.413***  
 
 
(0.129) 
 
(0.103)  
𝐷. 𝑙𝑛_𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 
 
0.775*** 
 
0.882***  
  
(0.108) 
 
(0.086)  
𝐷. 𝑙𝑛_𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 
 
-0. 008 
 
-0.101  
  
(0.076) 
 
(0.087)  
𝐿. 𝑙𝑛_𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡  5.368* 
 
1.143*** 
 
0.35 
 (3.019) 
 
(0.021) 
 
 
𝐿. 𝑙𝑛_𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 -1.301 
 
1.010*** 
 
0.33 
 
(1.609) 
 
(0.014) 
 
 
𝐿. 𝑙𝑛_𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 7.362 
 
-0.069*** 
 
0.48 
 
(6.989) 
 
(0.024) 
 
 
Constant 
 
-5.026*** 
 
-2.112***  
  
(0.637) 
 
(0.192)  
Joint Hausman test Statistic=1.08 P-value=0.78 
Observations 2307 
No. of countries 96 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
An important finding of Table 7 is that the long-run fiscal revenue elasticity with respect to 
the TOT is statistically significantly different from zero and negative. This significant 
negative coefficient suggests that when the TOT increases (i.e., the price of exports increases 
more than the price of imports), the primary fiscal revenues go down. That may be related to 
 25 
 
 
 
 
tax incentives for exports as well as a large presence of import taxes in the countries of our 
sample. If indeed the tax structure provides incentives towards exports, an increase in the 
export-orientation of a country may make that long-run elasticity negative. The mean value 
of the short-run fiscal revenue elasticity with respect to the TOT, in turn, is not statistically 
significantly different from zero. However, for countries whose tax on imports and exports 
are relevant, such as commodity exporters, this short-run elasticity is highly significant as 
will be shown in the analysis for country groupings later on. This is already clear from Table 
A6, in which the short-run elasticity with respect to the TOT is found to be significant for 
some countries. 
 
Financial Stress Index 
 
Now we examine an additional specification including the financial stress index itFSI  as 
explanatory variable in line with Model (5) of Table 5. Because of the data unavailability for 
itFSI  in LICs, the sample size of such specification becomes much smaller than the previous 
ones. To ensure the reliability of the regression results, we delete countries whose time series 
for itFSI  are shorter than or equal to 10 years. This way, 32 AEs and EMEs are retained. 
 
We also control for financial crisis episodes separately. If the financial conditions indeed 
have a significant impact on fiscal revenue, its effect in the episodes of financial crisis could 
be quite different from that in normal periods. Besides using the short-run revenue elasticity 
to itFSI  in order to measure the response of itPFR  to the normal deterioration of financial 
stress,13 we add a dummy variable in the regression to capture the possible extra effect of 
financial markets in crisis periods. Then the dynamic heterogeneous panel data model is 
modified as follows: 
 
  ' 5, 1 , '1 0 0ln ln ,it i i t i ii it it i it it itPFR FR c X X dummy SP F I             (12) 
 
where: 
 
(ln , ln , ln , ) 'it it it it itRGDP Def TOT FSIX , and 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖𝑡 = {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 ≥ 3 
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 < 3
. 
 
The threshold value of 3itFSI   is chosen to define a financial crisis given that it indicates a 
three-standard-error deviation from average financial conditions across sub-indices. This 
could be generated, for example, by large declines in asset prices or an abrupt increase in risk 
                                                 
13
 Such financial stress could be caused by the higher volatility in financial markets or lower returns of financial 
assets. 
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and uncertainty of financial markets. In fact, the aggregate short-run fiscal revenue elasticity 
with respect to itFSI  is then given by: 
 
 4 50 0 .i i itDummy    
 
Table 8 reports the MG and PMG estimation results for the Equation (12) above. The 
Hausman test cannot reject the null of long-run homogeneity, since the statistic is 0.47 with 
the P-value equal to 0.98. Hence, we choose the PMG estimator for this specification. Table 
A6 in the Appendix provides, in addition, the country-specific short-run elasticities, 
including those with respect to FSI and the financial crisis dummy variable. For the 32 
countries covered, the average elasticity with respect to real GDP becomes smaller, either in 
the short- or long-run. Regarding the elasticity with respect to the GDP deflator, we find that 
the bracket-creep effect still exists in the long run. 
 
Table 8. Fiscal Revenue Elasticities (Mean): Equation (12), Full Sample  
  MG PMG (preferred) Hausman test 
VARIABLES LR SR LR SR P-value 
ECP 
 
-0.794*** 
 
-0.375***  
  
(0.102) 
 
(0.054)  
𝐷. 𝑙𝑛_𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡  
 
0.727*** 
 
0.829***  
 
 
(0.190) 
 
(0.134)  
𝐷. 𝑙𝑛_𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 
 
1.057*** 
 
0.976***  
  
(0.317) 
 
(0.143)  
𝐷. 𝑙𝑛_𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 
 
-0.087 
 
-0.164  
  
(0.189) 
 
(0.121)  
𝐷. 𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 
 
-0.003 
 
0.002  
  
(0.003) 
 
(0.001)  
𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 ∙ 𝐷. 𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 
 
-0.004 
 
-0.004  
  
(0.005) 
 
(0.003)  
𝐿. 𝑙𝑛_𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡  0.986** 
 
0.831*** 
 
0.86 
 (0.434) 
 
(0.034) 
 
 
𝐿. 𝑙𝑛_𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 1.203** 
 
1.107*** 
 
0.92 
 
(0.488) 
 
(0.021) 
 
 
𝐿. 𝑙𝑛_𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 0.315 
 
0.117*** 
 
0.62 
 
(0.196) 
 
(0.031) 
 
 
𝐿. 𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 -0.005 
 
-0.005*** 
 
0.97 
 
(0.004) 
 
(0.002) 
 
 
Constant 
 
-9.164* 
 
-2.009***  
  
(4.969) 
 
(0.296)  
Joint Hausman test Statistic=0.47 P-value=0.98 
Observations 728 
No. of countries 32 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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The long-run elasticity with respect to the TOT is now significantly positive. As it will be 
shown later on, this is related to the sample composition in Table 8 towards for AEs and 
EMEs which are more financially integrated and, therefore, with more data for the itFSI  
index. For this sample, a larger terms-of-trade suggests that economic activity is accelerated, 
generating more revenues for the government. The short-run elasticity on average is, in turn, 
not significant. 
 
In the long run itFSI  has a significantly negative effect on fiscal revenue, even when the real 
GDP, the GDP deflator, and TOT are controlled for. Along with the deterioration of 
conditions in financial markets (higher risks or lower assets returns), the aggregate nominal 
primary fiscal revenue seems to be persistently affected negatively. This reinforces recent 
calls for the inclusion of financial variables in the analyses of structural balances (Price and 
Dang, 2011; Borio et al., 2013; and Poghosyan et al., 2015). It might also indicate a change 
in the country’s risk perception as well as a reduction in private investment due to 
uncertainty (Bloom, 2009), having a persistent effect in the country’s revenue base. In the 
short run, both FSI and the dummy variable of financial crisis, on average, have no 
significant effect on fiscal revenue.14 
 
C.   Sub-sample Analyses 
This subsection divides the full sample into several sub samples. Different groups of 
countries may have different elasticity properties, especially owing to distinguished sources 
of fiscal revenues and tax systems.  
 
Our first sub-sample analysis utilizes our baseline model in two ways. First, we divide the 
countries in three groups according to their income level—AEs, EMEs, and LICs. Second, 
the analysis splits the countries into groups depending on whether they are commodity 
exporters (CEC), within which a sub-group of oil producing countries is included or not. 
 
The estimation results of these two division criteria are shown in Tables 9 and 10, 
respectively. For each subgroup, we use again the Hausman test to decide whether the PMG 
approach should be employed or not. Only the mean values of the heterogeneous elasticities 
are reported in the tables. For all subsamples, the PMG approach is preferred. 
 
Income level country groups 
 
                                                 
14
 Table A7 indicates that financial crises have a significant short-run influence on fiscal revenue for a few 
countries. The effect is usually negative, except for UK. The difference of short-run influences of financial 
stress and financial crisis among different economies may reflect the differences in the economic and financial 
structure, the stage of financial development and the tax system of these economies. 
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For real GDP, on average, LIC’s fiscal elasticities seem to be larger than those of advanced 
economies both, in the short- and in the long-run. This indicates that for those countries, 
economic growth has more influential impact on the aggregate fiscal revenue. The bracket-
creep effect of inflation exists in the long run for AEs, but not for EMEs and LICs. The effect 
of TOT on fiscal revenue is negative for AEs and LICs in the long-run, but positive for 
EMEs, albeit small. This may be related to the fact that AEs and LICs tend to be net 
importers and may rely on more import taxes and tariffs, whereas for EMEs (net exporters) 
the boost in domestic activity generated by the terms-of-trade leads to a higher revenue 
collection. The short-run effect of TOT is not significant for any of the three groups. 
 
Table 9. Fiscal Revenue Elasticities (Mean): Baseline Model, Sub-samples, Case 1 
 AEs (PMG) EMEs (PMG) LICs (PMG) 
    SR   LR   SR   LR   SR   LR 
Real GDP 
 
1.02*** 0.86*** 1.21*** 1.16*** 1.70*** 1.53*** 
GDP deflator 0.91*** 1.16*** 
 
0.98*** 0.98*** 0.74*** 0.94*** 
TOT -- -0.16***   -- 0.07*    -- -0.30*** 
ECP -0.24*** -0.37*** -0.37*** 
Observations 880 446 981 
No. of countries 28 21 47 
Note:  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. -- denotes that the  
relevant coefficient is not significant. 
 
We also perform the sub-sample analysis for Equation (12). For the two groups (20 AEs and 
12 EMEs), the results given by Table 10 are consistent with our previous findings. On 
average, the elasticities of real GDP are larger for EMEs than for AEs both in the short- and 
in the long-run, but particularly for the latter. The bracket-creep effect of inflation is  
significant in the long-run for AEs. The long-run effect of the TOT on fiscal revenue remains 
negative for AEs, but positive for EMEs. 
 
Financial stress has a significantly positive, but very small long-run effect on fiscal revenues 
for AEs which, therefore, are not relevant for structural balances calculations. In EMEs, the 
long-run effects of financial stress are significantly negative. In the short run, AEs also have 
a positive and small elasticity of financial stress on revenues, but a negative extra effect in 
crisis periods, albeit this latter result is not robust to different crisis identification as we will 
show later on.15 For EMEs, financial stress in both, normal and crisis periods, has no 
significant short-run influence on average. Table A8 in the appendix provides the country-
specific results of sub-sample estimations of Equation (12). 
                                                 
15
 Such significant effects may be related to financial taxation among other characteristics of financial markets 
in those countries (see Matheson, 2011). 
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Table 10. Fiscal Revenue Elasticities (Mean): Equation (12), Sub-samples, Case 1 
 AEs (PMG) EMEs (PMG) 
    SR     LR   SR    LR 
Real GDP 
 
0.75*** 0.35*** 0.83*** 0.90*** 
GDP deflator 1.05*** 1.48*** 1.10*** 1.07*** 
TOT -0.30* -0.44***    -- 0.09** 
FSI 0.003*** 0.005***    -- -0.013*** 
Dummy∙FSI -0.003*     --  
ECP -0.30*** -0.50*** 
Observations 549 179 
No. of countries 20 12 
Note:  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. -- denotes that the  
relevant coefficient is not significant. 
 
Commodity exporters 
 
Table 11 presents the analysis for the second type of country grouping depending on whether 
they are commodity exporters or not. As expected, the results suggest that for oil exporters, 
the TOT has a significant positive effect on fiscal revenue both in short- and long-run. Again, 
an improvement in TOT in commodity exports boosts economic activity and increases fiscal 
savings in those countries (Adler and Magud, 2015; and Celasun et al., 2015). This effect has 
the inverted sign for the non-exporting countries. For these latter, terms-of-trade has a 
significantly negative effect on fiscal revenue in the long-run. 
 
Table 11. Fiscal Revenue Elasticities (Mean): Baseline Model, Sub-samples, Case 2 
 CEC (PMG) Oil CEC (PMG) Non-oil CEC (PMG) Non-CEC (PMG) 
    SR    LR   SR   LR   SR   LR   SR   LR 
Real GDP 
 
2.00*** 1.57*** 1.72*** 0.66*** 2.05*** 1.57*** 1.19*** 1.11*** 
GDP deflator 0.84*** 0.94*** 
 
1.07*** 1.09*** 0.80*** 0.93*** 0.90*** 1.01*** 
 
TOT   -- -0.28*** 0.37* 0.32***   -- -0.28***     -- -0.10*** 
ECP -0.41*** -0.50*** -0.46*** -0.31*** 
Observations 577 106 471 1730 
No.  of countries 27 5 22 69 
 Note:  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. -- denotes that the  
relevant coefficient is not significant. 
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The different effects of TOT on fiscal revenues between Oil-CEC countries and Non-oil CEC 
countries reflect the different economic structure and thus different revenue structure for 
these two country groups. It also reveals the need to take TOT into account when adjusting 
fiscal revenue, even when real GDP and GDP deflator have been controlled for. 
 
D.   Robustness Checks 
This section presents the robustness checks regarding the analysis using TOT and financial 
crisis. The roles of real GDP and GDP deflator on nominal fiscal revenue are straightforward. 
But the influence of TOT and financial stress conditions on fiscal revenue for a particular 
country may depend on this country’s economic structure and the importance of international 
trade and financial markets for this economy. Therefore, this section implements some 
robustness checks to test whether our previous results concerning TOT and financial stress 
and crisis are sensitive to different specifications of the model or parameters. 
 
Terms of Trade 
 
For TOT, our sub-sample analysis indicates that for oil-exporting countries, terms-of-trade 
has a significantly positive effect on fiscal revenue (Table 11). In this section we test if this 
result holds for largely opened economies in which taxation on international trade constitute 
a significant part of their fiscal revenues. 
 
An increase of export price or a decline of import price can result in an improvement of TOT, 
but they may have quite different and even opposite influences on one country’s international 
trade, aggregate economy and fiscal revenue. For oil-exporting countries, the fluctuation of 
TOT is more likely to be a result of the fluctuation of oil (export) price; but for other opened 
economies, the fluctuation of imported goods’ prices may govern the variability of TOT. 
 
Hence, we examine a group of countries for which the taxes on international trade and 
transactions  itFRT  constitute a big proportion of their total fiscal revenues  itPFR . We 
call these countries as “Trader (T) countries”. The proportion of the taxes on international 
trade and transactions to total fiscal revenues is denoted by T. When T is equal to or greater 
than 25 percent, 30 percent, or 35 percent, this country is called a T20 country, T25 country, 
or T30 country, accordingly. Table 12 gives the “T countries” in our sample, together with 
oil exporting countries. Most of the T countries are not oil exporters.  
 
Table A8 in the Appendix shows the PMG estimation results of our baseline model for “T 
countries”. It evinces that for these three groups of T countries the TOT has a significantly 
robust negative effect on fiscal revenue in the long run. This result is opposite to that for the 
group of oil exporters, revealing how the TOT affect negatively fiscal revenue in some of 
largely opened countries whose taxation may be more skewed towards import tariffs. 
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Table 12. Oil exporter countries (Oil CEC) and Trader “T” countries 
   Note: The definition of Oil CEC is given in Table A4 in the appendix. A country is defined as a “T country” if its  
taxes on international trade and transactions constitute more than or equal to x percent of its total fiscal revenue    
(in the sense of sample mean): when x=20, 25, or 30, it is a T20 country, T25 country or T30 country, respectively.  
 
Financial Stress 
 
We also check whether our previous results about the influences of financial stress condition 
and financial crisis on fiscal revenue are sensitive to our definition of financial crisis. 
Robustness checks are implemented in two ways. One is that a financial crisis period is 
defined when financial stress index is greater than or equal to 2.5 or 3.5: 
 
 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦2
𝑖𝑡
= {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 ≥ 2.5 
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 < 2.5
 
 
 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦3
𝑖𝑡
= {
1, 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 ≥ 3.5 
0, 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 < 3.5
 
 
The other check is the use of Laeven and Valencia (2008), covering the period of 1970–2007, 
to identify financial crisis periods. These authors define financial crisis as systemic banking 
crisis, currency crisis or debt crisis. 
 
Table A9 in the Appendix displays the financial crisis episodes identified by this database for 
the 32 countries covered by Equation (12). Since our dataset for model estimations covers the 
period 1970–2012, we extend the identification Laeven and Valencia (2008) for the period 
2008–2012 by using the financial stress index in the same way as before. Thus in the new 
financial-crisis dummy variable, 4itDummy , a financial crisis year is identified when the 
financial stress index is again greater than or equal to 3 for the period 2008–2012. 
Oil CEC T20 countries T25 countries T30 countries 
Algeria Algeria Algeria Algeria 
Ecuador  Benin Benin Benin 
Indonesia Comoros Comoros       -- 
Kazakhstan Dominica Dominica Dominica 
R. of Congo Ethiopia      --       -- 
Sudan Ghana      --       -- 
Venezuela Grenada      --       -- 
 Jamaica Jamaica       -- 
 Lebanon Lebanon       -- 
 Madagascar Madagascar Madagascar 
 Maldives Maldives Maldives 
 Niger Niger       -- 
 St. Vincent  St. Vincent  St. Vincent  
 Sudan       --       -- 
 Togo Togo Togo 
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For the previous estimations of Equation (12), shown in Tables 8 or 10, the number of 
financial crisis episodes identified for the 32 countries in that model was 79. For 2itDummy , 
3itDummy , and 4itDummy , the numbers of financial crisis episodes identified for the 32 
countries are respectively 97, 56, and 56. Because the country grouping analysis using the 
itFSI  indicates that financial stress (and financial crisis) has different effects on fiscal 
revenue for AEs and EMEs, we assume different long-run homogeneity of fiscal revenue 
elasticities for these two groups of countries. So in our robustness checks, we re-estimate 
Equation (12) for these two country groupings. 
 
The PMG estimation results, corresponding to 2itDummy , 3itDummy , and 4itDummy  are 
shown in Table A10, A11, and A12, respectively. Comparing these tables with Table 11, we 
conclude that our results are robust to the financial crisis episodes identification methods. 
Financial stress has a positive long-run effect on fiscal revenue for AEs, but a negative long-
run effect for EMEs. In the short run, financial stress has a positive effect in normal time on 
average for AEs, and for EMEs financial crisis episodes have no significant short-run 
influence, on average. The only non-robust result is that crisis episodes have a negative extra 
effect in the short-run for AEs. 
 
 
V.   STRUCTURAL FISCAL BALANCES 
This section displays the calculation of structural fiscal balances for several representative 
countries using the estimated fiscal elasticities. With the estimated revenue elasticities, we 
calculate the trend level of fiscal revenue for each country, given the trend-cycle 
decomposition method for explanatory cyclical factors. The trend level of government 
expenditure can be obtained according to Equation (7). The structural fiscal balances are then 
computed as the difference of trend fiscal revenue and trend fiscal expenditure. 
 
There exist several methods to do the trend-cycle decomposition in the literature.16 For 
simplicity, here we use the HP filter (with the usual HP parameter set to be 100 for annual 
data) 17 to do this decomposition for three cyclical factors under consideration: real GDP, 
                                                 
16
 Liu (2014)  gives a detailed literature review of the trend-cycle decomposition of aggregate variables, and 
provides a new framework to estimate structural fiscal balances, which combines DSGE modelling and state-
space econometric models and is different from the one employed in this paper. 
17
 Tereanu  et al. (2014) argue that successful implementation of structural fiscal targets requires the ability to 
measure output gaps accurately in real time, and potential GDP and the output gap are subject to significant 
revisions especially during crisis periods. They claim about a third of a growth surprise reflects on average a 
permanent change in potential growth and such an indicative rule of thumb could help improve the estimation 
of cyclically adjusted primary balances.  
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GDP deflator, and the term of trade index (all in logarithm). We assume zero as the constant 
trend level value for the financial stress index, which implies neutral financial market 
conditions on average across the banking sector, the securities markets and the exchange 
markets. 
 
 
Figure 2. US Structural Primary Fiscal Balances (in percent of potential nominal GDP)  
Note: PFB means primary fiscal balances (in percent of nominal GDP), and SPFB refers to structural primary fiscal balances 
(in percent of potential nominal GDP) adjusted using the elasticities estimated from model (5) (PMG approach) for two sub 
samples. SPFB1 is primary fiscal balances (in percent of potential nominal GDP) partially adjusted according to real GDP 
cycle and GDP deflator cycle only; and SPFB2 is primary fiscal balances (in percent of potential nominal GDP) partially 
adjusted according to real GDP cycle, GDP deflator cycle and TOT cycle only. 
 
 
Figure 3. Brazil Structural Primary Fiscal Balances (in percent of potential nominal GDP)  
Note: PFB means primary fiscal balances (in percent of nominal GDP), and SPFB refers to structural primary fiscal balances 
(in percent of potential nominal GDP) adjusted using the elasticities estimated from model (5) (PMG approach) for two sub 
samples. SPFB1 is primary fiscal balances (in percent of potential nominal GDP) partially adjusted according to real GDP 
cycle and GDP deflator cycle only; and SPFB2 is primary fiscal balances (in percent of potential nominal GDP) partially 
adjusted according to real GDP cycle, GDP deflator cycle and TOT cycle only. 
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Figures 2 and 3 depict the primary fiscal balances ( itPFB ) (in percent of nominal GDP) and 
structural primary fiscal balances ( itSPFB )—in percent of potential nominal GDP defined as 
the product of trend real GDP and trend GDP deflator—for the US and Brazil. In addition, 
Figures B1 and B2 in Appendix B display itPFB  and itSPFB  for Italy and China. In those 
figures we use the fiscal revenue elasticities estimated using the specification of Equation (12) 
for AEs and EMEs groups (Table A8). There, we also plot the primary fiscal balances (in 
percent of potential nominal GDP) partially adjusted according to the real GDP cycle and the 
GDP deflator cycle only; or according to the real GDP cycle, the GDP deflator cycle and the 
TOT cycle. 
 
For the US (and Italy), the evolving path of itSPFB  does not deviate much from that of 
itPFB . But for Brazil (and China), the itSPFB  deviates substantially from itPFB . For Brazil, 
before the year 2000, the itPFB  is always negative (indicating a fiscal deficit), but the 
itSPFB  is always positive, suggesting a structural primary surplus. 
 
We obtain several interesting findings for the four countries analyzed. First of all, the 
adjustment of the fiscal balances to the real GDP cycle and the GDP deflator cycle accounts 
for most of the necessary correction. This implies that the real GDP and the GDP deflator are 
the most important factors that would affect nominal fiscal balances for them. Secondly, 
adjusting fiscal balances according to the cyclical fluctuation of TOT is necessary for some 
countries, especially for the US and Brazil. Third, financial stress conditions and financial 
crises seem to play a little role in the structural adjustment of fiscal balances in those 
countries, even though their elasticities are statistically significant. This is because the 
revenue elasticities (both in the short- and long-run) with respect to itFSI  and financial crisis 
are very small, normally less than 1 percent in absolute value for these countries.18 
 
VI.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
How large are fiscal revenues elasticities around the world? This paper investigates 
empirically revenue elasticities for 96 countries spanning from 1970 to 2012. Revenue 
elasticities are estimated using a dynamic heterogeneous panel data model with respect to 
gaps in the real GDP, GDP deflator, TOT, and financial stress conditions.  
 
                                                 
18
 It is necessary to emphasize that the country-specific elasticities estimated in this paper are for reference only 
given that for many countries the time series of data are short. If quarterly data, rather than annual, are available, 
this increases the number of degrees of freedom and improves the estimations. 
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Homogeneity and heterogeneity of fiscal revenue elasticities are examined in detail. Sub-
sample analyses are implemented to see the distinct roles of real GDP, GDP deflator, TOT, 
and financial stress and financial crisis for different groups of economies. Sensitivity 
analyses are further implemented in order to verify the influences of TOT and financial stress 
and crisis on fiscal revenue. Finally, we calculate structural fiscal balances for Brazil, China, 
Italy, and the US as examples of how to apply our - elasticity-trend approach. 
 
Our main result evinces that for the 96 economies analyzed, on average, the TOT elasticity is 
significant, indicating the importance of using this variable in the calculation of structural 
fiscal balances. For the total sample that elasticity is negative, but for EMEs and oil exporters, 
the elasticity is highly significant and positive, as expected. 
 
Another important finding is that the short-run elasticity with respect to real GDP is 
significantly larger than one for our sample. This finding confirms the important automatic 
stabilizing role that fiscal policy plays around the world. This was particularly the case for 
LICs, as our subsample analysis demonstrates, indicating a rise in revenue mobilization in 
those economies over time through tax reforms and improvements in revenue collection 
(Gupta and Tareq, 2008; and IMF, 2011).  
 
Finally, we also obtain that the bracket-creep effect of inflation on nominal aggregate fiscal 
revenue exists on average for AEs in the long-run. Moreover, for a reduced sample of 32 
countries, we find that financial stress (here captured by the financial stress index, FSI) has a 
negative long-run effect on fiscal revenue in EMEs, but in the short run both FSI and the 
dummy variable of financial crisis on average have no significant effect on fiscal revenues.  
 
With those elasticities, we calculate the structural fiscal balances for Brazil, China, Italy and 
the US to illustrate our methodology. Such exercise highlights that for these countries, real 
GDP cycle and GDP deflator cycle explain most part of the fluctuation of nominal fiscal 
balances. However, adjusting fiscal balances according to the cyclical fluctuation of TOT is 
relevant for Brazil, a large emerging and commodity exporting country. 
 
Our research also points out to the importance of using terms of trade and long-run (besides 
short-run) elasticities when computing structural balances. Ignoring that short-term tax 
elasticities may differ from long-term tax elasticities may contribute to inaccurate (cyclically-
adjusted) fiscal indicators on which policy actions or recommendations may be based 
(Wolswijk, 2007). 
 
Further research on fiscal elasticities and structural fiscal balances based on the cross-country 
perspective of this paper can be carried on at least in three dimensions. First, with more 
available data, one-off effects could be better corrected and the same estimations can be 
perfomed for different types of tax revenues. This would allow us to apply different 
elasticities for different tax bases. Secondly, one could estimate long-run elasticities 
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assuming a Pooled Mean Group approach in which only a subset of them are homogeneous 
across countries (Pesaran et al., 1997). Third, a comprehensive theoretical macroeconomic 
model could be developed, in order to better understand the mechanism of the cyclical 
factors affecting the aggregate fiscal revenue, expenditures, and their interactions. We leave 
these extensions for further research. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A: Supplementary Tables 
 
Table A1. List of variables and data source 
Variable Description Source 
𝑃𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡 Primary fiscal revenue IMF WEO database and author’s computation 
𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡 Primary fiscal expenditure IMF WEO database and author’s computation 
𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 Real GDP IMF WEO database  
𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 GDP deflator IMF WEO database  
𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 Terms of trade IMF WEO database 
𝐻𝑃𝑖𝑡 Index of house price OETSADB database 
𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑡 Index of share price IFTSTSUB database 
𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 Financial stress index Balakrishnan et al. (2009) and IMF update 
𝑈𝑖𝑡 Unemployment rate IMF WEO Database 
𝐹𝑅𝑇𝑖𝑡 Taxes on international trade and transactions IMF WEO Database 
FCE Financial crisis episodes  Laeven and Valencia (2008) 
 
Table A2. Summary of the Raw Panel Data 
 No. of cross 
sections 
Observations per cross section No. of 
observations minimum average Maximum 
𝑙𝑛_𝑃𝐹𝑅𝑖𝑡  147 8 22.6 43 3328 
𝑙𝑛_𝑃𝐹𝐸𝑖𝑡  147 6 21.1 43 3095 
𝑙𝑛_𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖𝑡 147 1 38.0 43 5585 
𝑙𝑛_𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡 147 11 38.1 43 5607 
𝑙𝑛_𝑇𝑂𝑇𝑖𝑡 142 9 36.1 43 5133 
𝑙𝑛_𝐻𝑃𝑖𝑡 18 25 40.1 41 721 
𝑙𝑛_𝑆𝑃𝑖𝑡 39 8 25.1 42 977 
𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 44 5 20.3 33 895 
𝑈𝑖𝑡 88 6 29.4 43 2585 
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Table A3. Descriptive Statistics for the Processed Panel Data, 1970–2012 
 
 
PFR/GDP PFE/GDP RGDP growth GDP Deflator Inflation TOT growth Housing price inflation Share Prices Inf. FSI Unemp. Rate FRT/GDP
percent of GDP percent of GDP percent percent percent percent percent index number percent percent of GDP
All 29.99 30.05 3.61 6.97 0.65 6.82 12.29 -0.02 7.97 3.29
AE 39.26 39.14 2.65 5.16 0.05 6.82 9.28 0.05 6.50 0.91
EME 25.32 25.65 4.59 8.52 0.78 NA 18.21 -0.23 8.28 1.98
All 12.21 12.04 4.06 7.89 11.12 8.66 31.84 2.28 5.69 3.98
AE 9.70 10.22 2.83 6.48 4.42 8.66 23.97 2.43 3.90 1.03
EME 8.83 9.35 4.13 8.19 8.21 NA 41.70 1.83 4.44 1.66
All 4.48 8.42 -41.89 -24.57 -50.87 -18.31 -92.67 -5.87 0.31 0.00
AE 13.19 11.98 -14.10 -6.01 -21.83 -18.31 -92.67 -5.87 0.31 0.00
EME 10.72 10.97 -17.70 -5.99 -27.88 NA -60.09 -3.64 0.66 0.15
All 67.79 80.13 33.63 77.30 90.41 70.10 321.05 14.99 37.25 37.75
AE 60.37 66.43 14.78 77.30 28.20 70.10 111.15 14.99 25.00 4.99
EME 53.83 48.22 15.20 75.27 63.05 NA 321.05 7.15 22.45 9.63
Statistic
Country 
Grouping
Maximum
Mean
Standard Deviation
Minimum
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Table A4. IMF FAD-specific Country Groupings 
Advanced Economies (AEs) (30) Emerging Market Economies (EMEs) (29) 
country  code country  code country  code country  code 
U.S 111 Greece 174 Turkey 186 Thailand 578 
U.K 112 Iceland 176 South Africa 199 Kenya 664 
Austria 122 Ireland 178 Argentina 213 Morocco 686 
Belgium 124 Portugal 182 Brazil 223 Nigeria 694 
Denmark 128 Spain 184 Chile 228 Kazakhstan 916 
France 132 Australia 193 Colombia 233 Bulgaria 918 
Germany 134 New Zealand 196 Mexico 273 Russia 922 
Italy 136 Israel 436 Peru 293 China 924 
Netherlands 138 Hong Kong  532 Jordan 439 Ukraine 926 
Norway 142 Korea 542 Saudi Arabia 456 Latvia 941 
Sweden 144 Singapore 576 India 534 Hungary 944 
Switzerland 146 Czech  935 Indonesia 536 Lithuania 946 
Canada 156 Slovak  936 Malaysia 548 Poland 964 
Japan 158 Estonia 939 Pakistan 564 Romania 968 
Finland 172 Slovenia 961 Philippines 566   
 Note: There are 147 countries in the sample, and the remaining countries are defines as Other Developing Economies 
(ODE). 
 
 
 
 
Table A5. Commodity Exporter Countries (CEC): 50 Countries 
country code country code country code country code 
Algeria 
1 
612 Ecuador 
1
 248 Mauritania 682 Senegal 722 
Argentina 213 Egypt 469 Moldova 921 Sierra Leone 724 
Armenia 911 Gambia, The 648 Mozambique 688 Sudan 
1
 732 
Australia 193 Ghana 652 New Zealand 196 Tajikistan 923 
Benin 638 Guatemala 258 Nicaragua 278 Tanzania 738 
Bolivia 218 Guyana 336 Niger 692 Togo 742 
Burundi 618 Honduras 268 Norway 142 Uganda 746 
Cameroon 
1
 622 Indonesia 
1
 536 Panama 283 Uruguay 298 
Central African 
Republic 
626 Kazakhstan 
1
 916 Papua New 
Guinea 
853 Venezuela 
1
 299 
Chile 228 Kenya 664 Peru 293 Zambia 754 
Colombia 233 Kyrgyz Republic 917 Russia 
1
 922 Zimbabwe 698 
Congo, R. of 
1 
634 Malawi 676 Rwanda 714   
Côte d'Ivoire 662 Mali 678 Saudi Arabia 
1
 456   
Note:  A country is defined as a commodity exporter if the exports of its primary commodities constitute more than 50 
percent of its total exports (in the sense of sample mean), like in Cavalcanti et al. (2014). 1 indicates that this country is an 
oil producer, also according to IMF FAD-specific country groupings. 
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Table A6. Short-run Fiscal Revenue Elasticities: Model (2), PMG 
 Country  EC parameter Real GDP GDP deflator TOT 
AE(28) Australia -- 1.293*** -- -- 
 Austria -- 0.611*** 1.333*** -- 
 Belgium -0.178*** 0.465*** 1.259*** -- 
 Canada -- 0.895*** 1.172*** -0.274* 
 Czech Republic -0.681** 1.244*** 0.880*** -- 
 Denmark -0.549*** 1.113*** 0.502*** -- 
 Estonia -- 0.486*** 0.868*** 1.699*** 
 Finland -0.240*** 0.635*** 0.985*** -- 
 France -0.252** 0.924*** 1.028*** -0.155* 
 Germany -- 0.767*** 1.222*** -- 
 Greece -- 0.639** 1.095*** -- 
 Iceland -0.377*** 1.241*** 0.870*** -- 
 Italy -- 0.701*** 0.988*** 0.182* 
 Hong Kong SAR -0.484*** 1.750*** 0.981* -- 
 Japan -0.223** 1.034*** 1.009*** -0.146*** 
 Korea -0.380** 0.857*** -- -- 
 Netherlands -- 0.726*** 1.977*** -2.158** 
 New Zealand -- 1.075*** 1.482*** -- 
 Norway -0.145** 1.308*** 0.985*** 0.220*** 
 Portugal -- 1.039*** 0.719*** -- 
 Singapore -- 3.269*** 2.070*** -4.130*** 
 Slovak -0.336** 0.893*** -- -- 
 Slovenia -0.562** 1.047*** 1.093*** -- 
 Spain -- 1.064*** 1.191*** -- 
 Sweden -- 1.038*** 1.123*** -- 
 Switzerland -0.164* 0.924*** -- -- 
 United Kingdom -0.339*** 0.737*** 1.319*** -0.368*** 
 United States -0.109* 1.649*** 1.183*** -0.204** 
EE(21) Argentina -- 1.395*** 1.187*** -- 
 Brazil -1.070*** -- 1.052*** -- 
 Chile -0.465*** 2.481*** 0.799*** -- 
 China -0.0706** 0.746* -- -- 
 Colombia -- 1.338*** 0.954*** -0.165** 
 Hungary -0.676*** -- 1.290*** -1.903** 
 India -0.304** 1.063** 1.444*** -0.939** 
 Indonesia -0.372*** -- 0.959*** -- 
 Jordan -- 0.677* 0.947*** -- 
 Kenya -0.392*** 2.405*** -- -- 
 Latvia -0.422*** 1.029*** 1.042*** -- 
 Lithuania -0.802*** 0.962*** 0.897*** -- 
 Malaysia -- 0.954** -- -- 
 Mexico -0.287** 0.679* 0.800*** -- 
 Morocco -0.295* -- -- -- 
 Pakistan -- -- -- -- 
 Philippines -- 2.119*** 2.172*** -- 
 Poland -0.511** 1.235** 1.630*** -0.704*** 
 Russia -0.585** 1.884*** 0.833*** -- 
 Thailand -0.477*** 1.998*** 2.136*** -- 
 Ukraine -0.118 1.199*** 0.891*** -- 
Note:  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. -- denotes that the  
relevant coefficient is not significant. 
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Table A7. Short-run Fiscal Revenue Elasticities: Equation (12), PMG 
Country EC 
parameter  
Real  
GDP  
GDP  
deflator  
TOT Financial 
stress  
Financial crisis 
dummy 
Australia -- 1.223*** -- -- 0.006* -0.008* 
Austria -0.379*** -- 0.865*** -- -- -- 
Belgium -0.205** -- 0.881*** -- -- -- 
Canada -- 0.851*** 1.281*** -0.312** -- -- 
Denmark -0.312*** 0.975*** 0.543*** 0.322* -- -- 
Finland -0.274*** 0.825*** 0.770*** -- -- -- 
France -0.136* 0.582*** 1.123*** -0.373*** -- -- 
Germany -0.295* 0.594** 1.435*** -- -- -- 
Greece -- -- 2.964** -- -- -- 
Italy -0.328*** -- 0.814*** -- 0.004* -- 
Japan -0.129** 1.084*** 0.763** -- -- -- 
Korea -0.736*** -- -- -- 0.012*** -- 
Netherlands -- 0.661*** 1.777*** -2.112** -- -- 
Norway -0.121* 1.404*** 1.048*** 0.213** -- -- 
Portugal -1.205*** -- -- -- -- -- 
Spain -0.297*** 1.516*** 0.981*** -- -- -- 
Sweden -- 1.099*** 1.315*** -- -0.005** -- 
Switzerland -0.195*** 1.257*** -- 0.360*** -- -0.015*** 
United Kingdom -- 1.121*** 1.182*** -- -- 0.008** 
United States -0.121* 1.265*** 1.266*** -0.482*** -- -0.009*** 
Argentina -- 0.953*** 1.464*** -- -- -- 
Brazil -1.085*** 0.882*** 1.542*** -- 0.012** -- 
Chile -0.564*** 3.583*** 3.337*** -0.646*** -- -- 
China -0.060** 0.986* 1.582*** -- -0.009* -- 
Colombia -1.037*** 1.414*** 0.763** -- -- -- 
Hungary -0.678*** -- -- -2.553** -- -- 
Malaysia -0.593*** -- -- -- 0.018*** -- 
Mexico -0.355*** 1.471*** -- 1.221** 0.017** -0.024* 
Morocco -- -- -- -- 0.018** -- 
Pakistan -0.498** -- -- 0.584* -- -- 
Philippines -0.485** 1.095* 1.184* -- -- -- 
Poland -0.621*** 1.347*** 0.918*** -0.392** -- -- 
Note:  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. -- denotes that the  
relevant coefficient is not significant. 
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Table A8. Long-run and Short-run Fiscal Revenue Elasticities: Equation (12), Sub-samples 
Country EC 
parameter  
Real  
GDP  
GDP  
deflator  
TOT Financial 
stress  
Financial crisis 
dummy 
Long-run for AE  0.354*** 1.484*** -0.439*** 0.005***  
Short-run for AE       
Australia -0.062* 1.292*** -- -- -- -- 
Austria -0.369*** -- 0.517** -0.181* 0.004*** -- 
Belgium -0.168** 0.360** 0.785*** -0.301* -- -- 
Canada -- 0.786*** 1.315*** -0.270** -- -- 
Denmark -0.126*** 0.991*** 0.781*** -- -- -- 
Finland -0.163** 0.853*** 1.049*** -- -- -- 
France -0.077** 0.607*** 1.066*** -0.422*** -- -- 
Germany -0.909*** 0.712*** -- -- 0.005** -- 
Greece -1.154*** 0.878*** 1.792** -0.293* -- -- 
Italy -- 0.536** 1.211*** -- 0.006** -0.010* 
Japan -0.067* 1.098*** -- -0.149* -- -- 
Korea -0.550*** -- -- -- 0.017*** -- 
Netherlands -0.519*** 0.723*** 1.843*** -2.243*** -- -- 
Norway -- 1.478*** 1.148*** 0.155* -- -- 
Portugal -1.473*** -- 4.083*** -2.404*** -- -0.024* 
Spain -- 1.387*** 1.053*** -- -- -- 
Sweden -- 1.142*** 0.830*** -- -0.006** -- 
Switzerland -0.143*** 1.192*** -- 0.286** -- -0.016*** 
United Kingdom -- 1.303*** 1.158*** -- -- 0.008** 
United States -0.087* 1.263*** 1.101*** -0.605*** 0.003** -0.010*** 
Long-run for EE  0.901*** 1.070*** 0.093** -0.013***  
Short-runfor EE       
Argentina -- 0.982*** 1.363*** -- -- -- 
Brazil -1.009*** 0.940*** 1.716*** -0.200* 0.009* -- 
Chile -0.594*** 3.441*** 3.275*** -0.668*** -- -- 
China -0.065** 0.943* 1.578*** -- -0.009* -- 
Colombia -0.715** 1.181** 0.996** -- -0.012* -- 
Hungary -0.538** -- 1.024 -2.711** -- -- 
Malaysia -0.598*** -- -- -- 0.014*** -- 
Mexico -0.342*** 1.403*** -- 1.281** 0.014* -- 
Morocco -- -- -- -- 0.018** -- 
Pakistan -0.556** -- -- 0.493* -- -- 
Philippines -0.566*** -- 1.636** -- -- -- 
Poland -0.733*** 1.179*** 1.205*** -0.412*** -- -- 
Note:  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. -- denotes that the  
relevant coefficient is not significant. 
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Table A9. Fiscal Revenue Elasticities for “Trader T countries”: Baseline Model, PMG 
 T20 countries T25 countries T30 countries 
   SR   LR   SR    LR   SR   LR 
Real GDP 1.79*** 1.27*** 2.22*** 1.27*** 2.15*** 1.24*** 
GDP deflator 0.79*** 0.92*** 0.81*** 0.92*** 0.84*** 0.93*** 
TOT     -- -0.19***     -- -0.20***     -- -0.21*** 
ECP -0.45*** -0.45*** -0.46*** 
Observations 305 236 191 
No. of countries 13 10 8 
      Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. -- denotes that the  
relevant coefficient is not significant. A country is defined as a “T country” if its taxes on international  
trade and transactions constitute more than or equal to x percent of its total fiscal revenue (in the sense  
of sample mean): when x=20, 25, or 30, it is a T20 country, T25 country or T30 country  respectively.  
 
Table A10. Financial Crisis Episodes for Model (5): IMF Database, 1970-2007 
Country Financial crisis years (starting date) 
Australia  
Austria  
Belgium  
Canada  
Denmark  
Finland 1991,1993 
France  
Germany  
Greece 1983 
Italy 1981 
Japan 1997 
Korea 1997,1998 
Netherlands  
Norway 1991 
Portugal 1983 
Spain 1977,1983 
Sweden 1991,1993 
Switzerland  
United Kingdom 2007 
United States 1988, 2007 
Argentina 1975,1980,1981,1982,1987,1989,1995,2001,2002 
Brazil 1976,1982,1983,1987,1990,1992,1994,1999 
Chile 1972,1976,1981,1982,1983 
China 1998 
Colombia 1982, 1985, 1998 
Hungary 1991 
Malaysia 1997, 1998 
Mexico 1977, 1981, 1982, 1994, 1995 
Morocco 1980, 1981, 1983 
Pakistan 1972 
Philippines 1983, 1997, 1998 
Poland 1981, 1992 
            Source: Laeven and Valencia (2008). "Systemic Banking Crises: A New Database", IMF Working Paper.  
            Note: “Financial crisis” here refers to systemic banking crisis, currency crisis or debt crisis.   
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Table A11. Fiscal Revenue Elasticities (Mean): Equation (12), Robustness Check 1 
 AEs (PMG) EMEs (PMG) 
    SR   LR    SR   LR 
Real GDP 
 
0.76*** 0.35*** 0.88*** 0.90*** 
GDP deflator 1.06*** 1.49*** 1.04*** 1.07*** 
TOT -0.29* -0.44***    -- 0.09** 
FSI 0.003*** 0.005***    -- -0.013*** 
Dummy2∙FSI -0.002     --  
ECP -0.30*** -0.50*** 
Observations 549 179 
No. of countries 20 12 
          Note:  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. -- denotes that the  
relevant coefficient is not significant. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A12. Fiscal Revenue Elasticities (Mean): Equation (12), Robustness Check 2 
 AEs (PMG) EMEs (PMG) 
   SR   LR   SR   LR 
Real GDP 
 
0.77*** 0.35*** 0.80*** 0.91*** 
GDP deflator 1.09*** 1.49*** 1.14*** 1.06*** 
TOT -0.32** -0.45***    -- 0.09*** 
FSI 0.003*** 0.004***    -- -0.018*** 
Dummy3∙FSI -0.004**     --  
ECP -0.30*** -0.47*** 
Observations 549 179 
No. of countries 20 12 
        Note:  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. -- denotes that the  
relevant coefficient is not significant. 
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Table A13. Fiscal Revenue Elasticities (Mean): Equation (12), Robustness Check 3 
 AEs (PMG) EMEs (PMG) 
    SR    LR   SR   LR 
Real GDP 
 
0.76*** 0.36*** 0.67* 0.28** 
GDP deflator 1.06*** 1.47*** 1.42*** 1.73*** 
TOT -0.31* -0.47***    -- -0.12** 
FSI 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.007** -0.008* 
Dummy4∙FSI    --     --  
ECP -0.30*** -0.37*** 
Observations 549 179 
No. of countries 20 12 
          Note:  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. -- denotes that the  
relevant coefficient is not significant. 
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Appendix B: Supplementary Figures 
 
 
Figure B.1. Italy Structural Primary Fiscal Balances (in percent of potential nominal GDP)  
Note: PFB means primary fiscal balances (in percent of nominal GDP), and SPFB refers to structural primary fiscal balances 
(in percent of potential nominal GDP) adjusted using the elasticities estimated from model (5) (PMG approach) for two sub 
samples. SPFB1 is primary fiscal balances (in percent of potential nominal GDP) partially adjusted according to real GDP 
cycle and GDP deflator cycle only; and SPFB2 is primary fiscal balances (in percent of potential nominal GDP) partially 
adjusted according to real GDP cycle, GDP deflator cycle and terms of trade cycle only. 
 
 
Figure B.2. China Structural Primary Fiscal Balances (in percent of potential nominal GDP)  
Note: PFB means primary fiscal balances (in percent of nominal GDP), and SPFB refers to structural primary fiscal balances 
(in percent of potential nominal GDP) adjusted using the elasticities estimated from model (5) (PMG approach) for two sub 
samples. SPFB1 is primary fiscal balances (in percent of potential nominal GDP) partially adjusted according to real GDP 
cycle and GDP deflator cycle only; and SPFB2 is primary fiscal balances (in percent of potential nominal GDP) partially 
adjusted according to real GDP cycle, GDP deflator cycle and terms of trade cycle only. 
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